INTRODUCTION
The real estate downturn in 2007 created a drastic effect on US homeowners, lending institutions, and investors.' The fall of the housing market began a series of events which Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, described as a "once in a century credit tsunami. (also referred to as "RMBS"). These investors relied on the ratings of the securities issued by the ratings companies only to have the value of those securities decrease significantly due to real estate market downturn and subsequent re-rating of those securities by the ratings companies. The focus of this analysis will be on the liability of the securities ratings companies under both contract and tort theories. Specifically, potential liability will be analyzed under the doctrine of promissory estoppel in contracts and under an extension of negligence and products liability theories in torts. 6 Accordingly, the stance of this article is speculative and normative rather than descriptive of accepted views on the current state of the law. In order to properly determine whether liability under these theories should exist, it is necessary to understand the relationship between investors and the ratings companies. Furthermore, it is important to understand the real estate market, the market for RMBS, and the underlying market conditions that led to the investors' losses and potential liability of the ratings companies.
II. THE PROBLEM: WHAT HAPPENED IN THE REAL ESTATE MARKET MELTDOWN OF 2006-2008
The overall effects of the real estate market downturn, or "meltdown" as it has been called, are still being determined. 7 As the rate of housing foreclosures continue to rise, many lending institutions have announced large write-downs of assets related directly to the housing market, resulting in falling stock prices and business valuations. 8 Other leaders in the real estate mortgage market have not survived, either having been acquired by a competitor, taken over by the government, or 6 . There are obviously other theories and doctrines that could also be considered, such as misrepresentation, additional liability to third party beneficiaries under contract law and fraud under both tort and contract law. The extension of products liability to the ratings companies is an expansion of the theory developed by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren's application of products liability to consumer financial products. See Barr-Gill and Warren infra note 176; see also discussion infra p. 36. declared bankruptcy. 9 In light of this, the lending institutions that remained tightened credit guidelines making it more difficult for borrowers to obtain credit.10 One major effect the tightening credit guidelines is that borrowers who previously would have been able to borrow more money or refinance their loans, are now unable to do so.I 1 As a result, borrowers in risk of default and unable to refinance subsequently defaulted on their loans, while others no longer have access to funds that could be used to expand the economy. 2 By December 2007, the real estate market meltdown helped push the U.S. economy into the longest economic recession since World War II."3 To help avoid a potential economic recession, the Federal Reserve Bank lowered short-term US interest rates to almost zero from 2007 to 2008.14 In December 2007, the Federal Reserve issued a statement that it was more concerned with the current risk of an economic recession than the potential inflationary risk caused by lowering short-term interest rates. 15 In the wake of this economic uncertainty and meltdown of the real estate market, the potential causes are being unraveled and discussed. Legislators 
III. THE PARTIES IMPACTED BY INACTION AND INDECISION-
WHO'S AFFECTED, ALL TO BLAME?
As mentioned above, the current market downturn had a direct or indirect effect on almost every party involved with the US economy. 4 As recently as 2005, subprime mortgages and home equity loans securitizations totaled a staggering $525.7 billion. 25 Approximately 80 percent of subprime mortgages were securitized, adjustable rate mortgages. 2 6 As of March 2009, almost half of the subprime adjustable rate mortgages are either at least one payment past due in their payments or in foreclosure. 27 The real estate downturn greatly effected homeowners, hedge funds, investors, and lenders. 8 
SUB PRIME MARKET
The real estate backed securities market in the US has exploded into a multi-trillion dollar market over the last thirty years. 30 In the 1970s, large financial institutions lenders began to pool residential real estate mortgages together and transfer the assets into a trust, usually held by a third party. 3 " The third party trustee often sold shares of the trust to large institutional investors who purchased the shares in return for the cash flow generated from the underlying mortgages. 3 " This type of transaction is commonly referred to as securitization. 3 3 Almost all types of loans could be securitized, such as residential real estate loans, commercial loans, car loans, student loans, and even credit card receivables. 34 However, this commentary focuses on RMBS. 35 Lending institutions benefited from selling RMBS in several ways. The sale of the long term cash flow generated by the RMBS provided the lending institutions immediate capital to expand, meet regulatory reserve requirements, and satisfy shareholder profitability budgets. 36 By transferring the mortgages into a third party trust, the lending institutions 30 35. "A typical residential mortgage-backed securitization (RMBS) involves the following key parties: (1) the borrower, who is obligated to repay the mortgage; (2) the mortgage broker or lender (the "originator"); (3) the entity which purchases the loans from the originator and then sells the security instrument (the "issuer"); (4) the investment bankers, who structure, underwrite, and sell the securities; (5) the rating agencies, who are responsible for assigning a credit rating; (6) a credit enhancer, who guarantees that there will be a source of funds available for payments as they b.come due on the securities; and (7) 39 The investments seemed secure because, in addition to the diversification provided by the pooling of a large number of mortgages, initially RMBS primarily consisted of mortgages to high credit quality borrowers, often referred to as "prime mortgages" sold by large financial institutions to large institutional investors. 40 Investors, through market demand, helped direct the underwriting criteria and pricing for the types of mortgages that would be included in the securitizations. 4 1 However, in the 1990s, lenders began to pool and securitize higher risk mortgages, referred to as "subprime mortgages. '42 Subprime mortgages are loans to borrowers who, for a variety of reasons, are considered to be at a higher risk of default than prime mortgages. 4 3 These reasons include, but are not limited to: prior bankruptcies, lower than average credit scores, unverifiable income, higher debt to income ratios, and higher loan to value ratios. 4 Historically, a disproportionate amount of subprime borrowers have consisted of lower income classes and the elderly. 45 The overrepresentation of these vulnerable classes raises concerns of predatory practices within the subprime lending markets. 4 6 While numerous articles and commentaries have been written addressing who should be liable to the borrowers who fell victim to predatory lending practices, this article does not address that issue focusing instead on potential liability to investors in RMBS. Prior to the 1990s there was no viable market in which investors would purchase the subprime collateralized securities. 48 Advances in technology, however, made it possible to attempt to estimate and price the risk of subprime home loan pools. 49 In order for investors to be comfortable in purchasing shares collateralized by residential mortgages, a tranche system was created for these securities. 5 0 In this tranche system, various classes of securities were created in which senior classes of securities received credit support from junior, subordinated classes of securities sold by the same issuer. 5 " Under the tranche system, the investor who held the most senior position of the security would be repaid first until that investor was paid in full. Then the owner of the next senior tranche would be repaid. 52 This method of repayment would continue until the entire debt to investors was repaid. 5 3 The investors in the most senior tranche had the benefit of knowing they would be repaid first by the issuer of the RMBS. Additionally, in the case of default of the mortgage and liquidation of the underlying property(ies), the senior tranche investors would be repaid first with any remaining funds passed to the junior tranches in order of their seniority. 4 This default repayment structure is by virtue of the contractual subordination language in instrument which all the securities were issued. 55 Some lenders continued to service the mortgages 5 6 and held the most junior tranches of the underlying debt on their balance sheets." This provided investors some assurance that lenders were not just passing off undesirable loans to investors, as the lenders also had an economic incentive for the loans to be repaid because they retained a first loss position in the pool of mortgages subject to the RMBS transaction. 5 8 To further address investor concerns over the risk of subprime mortgage pools, many lenders also offered recourse to investors which required the lenders to take back any nonperforming mortgages in the pool and substitute them with perform- ing mortgages held by the lending institutions. 59 Additionally, some lenders even provided credit enhancement insurance to help investors become comfortable in purchasing securities collateralized by sub prime mortgages. 6°A lthough some investors purchased RMBS directly from a third party trust in a private transaction, most investors purchased the RMBS in a public market. 6 ' The investors in a public primary and secondary market (i.e. sold by others after initial offering) often rely on the investment ratings given by the ratings companies in determining the relative quality and underlying risk of the security. 6 2 The securities ratings companies that issue the ratings are supposed to be impartial third parties that conduct an analysis of the security and modeling of the market in order to determine the risk of loss of investing in the security.
6 3 Many investors rely on the ratings because they lack the time or the information to conduct a thorough investigation on their own, especially in constantly changing markets. 64 The higher the security is rated by the companies, presumably, the less risk of loss on the investment. 65 The senior securities backed by the same collateral pool will have higher values than the junior securities that provide credit support. 66 The highest rating given by S&P is AAA, which is considered to be very low risk.
6 7 By comparison, US Treasury Bonds usually carry AAA ratings. 6 8 Notably, the most senior tranches of many sub prime RMBS were issued AAA ratings during the real estate market boom from [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] Understandably, an investor relying on the rating to determine the investment risk would perceive the risk of investing in the most senior tranche of a sub prime RMBS similar to that of investing in the United States Government issued treasuries. 70 In fact, during the recent real estate market boom, S&P not only rated the most senior tranche of sub prime RMBS AAA, but also issued upgrades to many of the junior tranches that were initially given lower ratings. 7 ' This signaled to investors, who rely on the ratings to assess their investment risk, that even the junior tranches of the sub prime RMBS were of investment grade quality similar to the quality of investing in the bonds of many Fortune 500 companies. 7 2 V.
WHO SHOULD BE ACCOUNTABLE? EXAMINING THE
FACTS SURROUNDING POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF

THE RATINGS COMPANIES
The current real estate downturn created an environment in which many of the subprime mortgages that secured the RMBS began to default or experience higher risk of default. 73 By early 2005, the government, media, and economists began to express concern that a potential real estate market bubble loomed due to inflated real estate prices and increasing mortgage defaults. 74 Yet, ratings companies' upgrades of subprime RMBS continued to surpass the downgrades. issued a joint statement clarifying and expanding on two previous joint statements issued in 1999 and 2001 by the OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and the OTS regarding the government's concern of the risks associated with subprime mortgage lending. 79 The government expressed a concern in all three joint statements that lenders may not be fully assessing or protecting against the risks involved in making the subprime loans. 8° The concerns of the government regulators focused on lack of consumer understanding, potential predatory lending, rapidly increasing interest rates, lenders' inability to assess the risks of granting the loan, and the risks to the lenders in the face of large defaults. 8 ' Furthermore, the ratings companies, like the government regulatory agencies, are supposed to be impartial third parties that objectively assess the risks of the securities. 8 2 The ratings companies arguably should have been aware of the government agencies' concerns and should have taken those factors identified by the government agencies into consideration during their own analysis of rating the companies. Instead, a majority of the ratings companies' risk assessment of the underlying collateral focused on proper documentation of the loan and legal compliance of the originator rather than an assessment of the stability and projections Investors who purchased the highly rated RMBS did so under the belief that the security they were purchasing was of high quality and had a low risk of default. 89 As a result, the purchase prices of the securities were higher than those of similar income producing securities with lower ratings. 9 " Once the ratings companies downgraded the RMBS, investors not only saw the value of their investments drop drastically overnight, but the downgrade signaled to investors that their seemingly low risk investments were now, in fact, considered a high default risk. 9 ' This situation caused market observers and investors to question the reliability of the ratings generated by the ratings companies. 92 Further, some investors adversely affected by their reliance on the ratings also sought government aid to recoup the losses they incurred as a result of their reliance on the investment ratings generated by the ratings companies. 
A. Ratings Companies Strike Back!
To date, the ratings companies have successfully avoided class action liability for their ratings. 96 The ratings companies have supplied compelling legal and policy arguments that support their contention and belief that they should not be held liable for investors' losses. First, the ratings companies will likely rely on legal precedent and claim that their ratings are protected under the First Amendment. 97 Previous courts have held that the ratings of corporate bonds by the ratings companies equated to editorial commentary, which is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment right of freedom of the press. 98 Under such protections, in order to recover damages, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendants meet the New York Times v. Sullivan 9 9 standard of "actual malice." While the standard of "actual malice" may be difficult for RMBS investors to prove, the Second Circuit presented two factors to consider in determining whether a rating company should receive the same protections as the traditional press.°° First, according to the Second Circuit, courts should consider whether ratings companies are only "reporting on" the transactions for which they were hired.'O If so, the If no longer found to have First Amendment protection, the ratings companies can point to the fact that they have no direct privity of contract with the investors to attempt to avoid liability. 0 4 The ratings companies are engaged by and compensated by the companies wishing to package and sell the securities.' 0 5 Investors do not have the capabilities or the resources to independently research and analyze all of the companies and securities to adequately determine their risk and value compared to other securities.
1 0 6 As a result, investors usually will not purchase any securities that have not been rated by one of the major ratings companies like Standard and Poor's, Fitch, or Moody's.
1 0 7 The companies that wish to sell their securities to the larger market and intend to generate the most income for their sale are compelled by market demand to hire the rating companies to rate the securities.' 0 8 As a result, the privity of contract for the rating of the security is between the ratings companies and the companies that initially sell the securities. 09 To further their legal defenses, the ratings companies may point to an unforeseeable change in the real estate market conditions, which resulted in the losses to investors. Under this argument, the ratings companies can point to the sudden change in the real estate market and the market's subsequent meltdown as unforeseeable market events. As such, the ratings companies can argue that they should not be held liable for events that could not have been foreseen. Therefore, their ratings of the RMBS were accurate considering all of the foreseeable risks in the market. Thus, the losses suffered by investors were the result of an assumed risk by the investors for unforeseeable market events.
In addition to the legal arguments, the ratings companies could also introduce some policy arguments against holding them liable for the losses of investors in RMBS. The ratings companies could argue that they provide an integral service to market investors in rating the securities and companies.110 As noted above, investors do not have the resources to research and evaluate all of the companies and securities that are currently rated. The ratings companies could argue that if they were held liable for investors' losses, many ratings companies may not be able to pay the damages and therefore would no longer rate companies or their securities. The companies that survive could be hesitant to continue to rate companies in light of the new legal liability. Therefore they may choose to rate only a small percentage of the companies and securities that are rated as of today. The absence of the ratings would likely upset the bond and security market and lead to further disruption of the overall credit market.' Without the ratings, investors will either have to choose investments based on insufficient or expensive data, or more likely, seek other types of investments. This scenario would lead to information inequality which, in a market system, could lead to large gains by the few who have the resources and losses by those who do not possess the resources to accurately assess the risk of the securities or the companies. Should the market demand for the securities and bonds disappear due to the lack of the ratings, major companies and employers could face serious cash flow and expansion challenges, the effects of which could be felt in the overall national as well as global economies.
B. Possible Recovery for the Investors by Analogizing to the Restatement's View of Promissory Estoppel
Despite many of the arguments ratings companies could assert against liability, investors have compelling arguments and counterarguments as to why ratings companies should be held liable. Under classic contract theory, the investors of RMBS could try to seek damages from the ratings companies under the theory of promissory estoppel, Section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts." 2 Although the investors do not have a direct contractual relationship with the ratings companies, courts have held that third parties are entitled to relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel." 3 Thus, the facts present in the situation with 110 . See Kettering, supra note 104 pp. 1671-1680 (discussing the role of ratings.companies in the securitization market becoming "too big to fail").
111. See id. investors of RMBS and the ratings companies may create a situation that could meet the necessary requirements of Section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts which states:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise. 1 " 4 In this situation, the investors of RMBS, who have no direct agreement or interaction with the ratings companies, would argue that they qualify under Section 90 as third parties. 1 5 The investors' reliance on the ratings of the RMBS was a reasonably foreseeable result of the action taken by the ratings companies in rating the securities.' 16 Additionally, the investors will argue that the ratings companies in issuing and maintaining the rating of the RMBS, did so with the intention that investors would rely on the ratings and purchase the securities with the underlying risk of default being designated by the securities' ratings. Therefore, the ratings companies could reasonably foresee that their ratings would induce investors to purchase RMBS in reliance on the ratings.
The investors could point to several factors to establish that the ratings companies could reasonably foresee their reliance. First, the ratings companies have been providing this service to investors for over sixty years. (2006) . However, the theory presented in this note does not require a waiver of right or defense in order to hold the ratings companies liable to investors. Instead the company's designation as a NRSRO by the SEC supports the argument that reliance on the RMBS ratings was not only foreseeable, but also reasonable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
NRSROs. 1 9 Ironically, billions of dollars of RMBS securities would have theoretically met the government's requirements prior to the mortgage crisis that ultimately created the need for the TALF program. 20 With the seeming support from the United States government and the long history of the ratings companies, the investors' reliance on the ratings companies' ratings would seem reasonable.
In contrast, the ratings companies will argue that the disclaimers they issue, warning investors not to rely exclusively on the ratings, protect them from liability under Section 311 of the Second Restatement of Contracts.1 2 ' The Restatement provides, in relevant part:
Discharge or modification of a duty to an intended beneficiary by conduct of the promisee ... is ineffective if a term of the promise creating the duty so provides. In the absence of such a term, the promisor and promisee retain power to discharge or modify the duty by subsequent agreement. Such a power terminates when the beneficiary, before he receives notification of the discharge or modification, materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the promise or brings suit on it or manifests assent to it at the request of the promisor or promisee.1
The ratings companies will maintain that, under Section 311, the disclaimers discharged their duty to investors who relied on the ratings, because the investors were properly notified in advance of their purchase of the securities, as the disclaimers were issued contemporaneously with the RMBS ratings.' 2 3 However, as discussed above, the main purpose of the ratings companies is founded and created by the investors' reliance on those ratings when making their investment decisions.
12 4 The courts have repeatedly held that companies' disclaimers do not absolve companies of liability in cases in which they would otherwise be held liable under the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing. 25 The courts' rationale in these cases is that the disclaimer, if upheld, would frustrate the pur- pose of the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in contracts. 2 6 Similarly, this would hold true if the ratings companies' disclaimers were to absolve the companies of any legal liability to investors, whose reliance on the ratings was otherwise found to be reasonable and foreseeable. 27 Further, in addition to demonstrating reasonably foreseeable reliance, the investors will be challenged to demonstrate that the actions of the ratings companies induced them into purchasing the RMBS.' 28 To sustain a successful claim under Section 90, the investors must show that the main reason the issuing companies contracted with the ratings companies to issue and maintain the risk ratings was to attain a risk rating that would meet investment quality. 2 9 This, in turn, induced investors to purchase the RMBS. To support their claim, the investors will argue the reason the issuing companies paid for the ratings was to generate a belief that initial and subsequent investors would be able to rely on the ratings in determining whether or not to purchase the securities or invest in a similar investment vehicle. 3° The issuing companies benefited from higher securities ratings because the higher a security was rated, the lower the perceived default risk. Issuers with higher-rated securities could then demand a higher price from the market of investors. 31 This relationship clearly signals that it was the intention of the companies issuing the securities and the ratings companies that investors would subsequently rely on the ratings of the securities to determine their investment value and default risk.' 32 Further, the investors who purchased the securities benefited from the ratings companies continuing to maintain and monitor the ratings of the securities, as these investors could offer to resell the security to subsequent investors, who were further expected to rely on the ratings.' 3 3 In continuingly monitoring their ratings, rating companies support a larger secondary market for the securities.' 4 The initial rating benefits the issuer and the initial direct purchaser of the security.
1 35 If ratings companies did not continuingly monitor their ratings, the investors in the secondary market would likely 126 . See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 449; Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447; Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 95; Worley, I P.3d at 626-27.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
128. See, e.g., id. 129. This idea of issuers shopping for investment grade ratings from ratings companies is supported by scholars such as Kettering. Kettering, supra note 104 at 1681. The SEC also noted a concern with the management of the conflict of interests between ratings.companies and issuers. SEC Ratings Agency Report, infra note 181 at 23-26. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
1194
[Vol. 63:1177 lack the confidence in the initial rating and be hesitant to purchase a security with an older initial rating.' 3 6 Without the secondary markets' willingness to invest in securities, the market price of the initial securities would be adversely affected. The initial purchasers would have a less liquid investment. 3 This would decrease the demand for the securities because initial investors would have difficulty reselling the securities to subsequent investors. The result is a lower initial price for the initial sale of the security than the price of a security that is continually monitored. Again, the value of the ratings companies to the companies who pay for their services is created and supported by the investors who rely on the accuracy of the ratings. The investors could argue that the actions and motivations of the RMBS issuers and the ratings companies satisfied the reasonable foreseeability of reliance and inducement elements of Section 90 as well as making any purported disclaimers of liability ineffective.' 3 8
To satisfy the final element of Section 90, the investors must demonstrate that the remedy of receiving damages for their losses is necessary to avoid injustice. 39 The necessity of proof of injustice may effectively limit overextension of this doctrine and reserve liability to only those cases in which real issues have arisen, such as the predatory lending cases. 4° In such cases, persons of limited or fixed income find themselves with subprime mortgages, which swallow up nearly all of their monthly income. 4 ' These "predatory lending practice" cases could be discouraged by decreasing the supply side. For instance, if the motivation to engage in predatory lending practice is undermined by the threat that such cases would be facially indefensible should they sour, the investors would have obvious cases because they relied upon the third-party recommendation of designated RMBS issuers and ratings companies in approving such risks.' 4 2 The investors could seek justice by attempting to recover damages from ratings companies and/or issuers, under traditional Restatement principles, upon a showing that investors lost money on the overrepresentation of such risks and that such 136. Id. 137. Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
139. Id.
See id.; see also Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. [18] [19] (2001) (statement of Mrs. Mary Ann Podelco) (testifying about an incident where she was on fixed i.come, had her house paid off, and was solicited by a mortgage company to finance home improvements for a payment that amounted to more than half of her fixed i.come, which was $458; as a result, she lost her home) [ overselling resulted in investor lOSS.
1 4 3
C. Potential Liability by Extension of Tort Law to RMBS Ratings Companies
Investors may also attempt to argue for extension of the tort laws to their claims against RMBS ratings companies. If so, then the standards that may be applied would be similar, by analogy, to third party auditors' liability to non-clients. Here, the RMBS ratings companies and the independent auditor are similar in function. Both the third-party auditor and RMBS ratings companies are thought to be independent.' 44 In fact, a credit-rating agency that attempts to compete in the industry must first apply with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 4 5 In doing so, the credit-rating agency must make certain disclosures as part of the application process, designed to reveal any potential issues associated with its credibility, confidentiality of non-public information, and conflicts of interest. 14 6 Pursuant to statutory mandate, rules have been implemented to ensure that should the credit-rating agency become a NRSRO, all conflicts of interest are known and no impermissible conflicts of interest exist. 147 Additionally, the expertise and opinion of these independent parties-the auditor and the credit ratings companies-are all equally valuable to investors in the financial world. As such, just as auditors have not always been able to shirk responsibility for their negligence in overselling or over-valuating companies when their reports are relied upon by non-clients, the RMBS credit ratings companies should similarly not be allowed to escape liability by simply arguing that they lack privity with those who would rely so heavily upon their opinions. Courts typically apply three standards to accountants in negligent misrepresentation cases when, as here, privity probably would not be held to exist. They are: (1) the reasonable foreseeability rule, (2) the restatement rule, which applies to parties known to rely upon an accountant's advice, and (3) near privity.
Under the reasonable foreseeability rule, auditors have been held liable to parties with whom they lack privity in some jurisdictions. relied upon by third parties with whom they lack privity, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to let them avoid liability in Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler. 4 9 In Rosenblum, the issue of what duty, if any, an auditor might owe to a third party without privity was extended to provide that auditors have a duty to anyone who the auditor should reasonably foresee to rely upon his statements and opinions, so long as the third party obtained the statement directly from the auditor and relied upon it for a proper business purpose. 5 '
In this case, the reasonable foreseeability rule has both positive and negative aspects in applying it to impose liability on the rating companies. On the positive side, the ratings companies prepare reports for an express group of people to rely upon it for business purposes. 151 Furthermore, the statutory and regulatory hurdles imposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission provide built-in rules to prevent any conflicts of interest on the part of the RMBS issuers and rating companies. Thus, the reports are necessarily prepared and relied upon for proper business purposes.1 52 Further, there is only a narrow use for such ratings; therefore, the pool of plaintiffs is both limited and reasonably foreseeable. However, it should be noted that this would extend the reasonable foreseeability rule beyond a strict reading of Rosenblum, because accountant liability was cut-off to only those third parties who actually received statements from the auditor. 15 3 If someone had received it from another market source or even acquired an auditor statement on the internet or at the library, liability would not apply even if it was for a proper business purpose and was embarrassingly, but unintentionally wrong.
154
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, if anything, is more amenable to possible liability of the rating agencies than the reasonable foreseeability rule, because it is not as limited in that it would allow plaintiffs who were foreseeable but did not receive their statements directly from accountants. part:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others (1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. (2)The liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction. 1
56
Thus, under Section 552, an accountant would be liable for incorrect financial statements, audits or reports, as long as they were actually relied upon by plaintiffs who were foreseeable and part of limited class. 1 57 Thus, an accountant who prepares financial reports for a client owes a duty not only to the client but to any other person who is part of a limited group of persons whom the accountant knows will ultimately receive and rely upon it regardless of whether the financial reports came directly from the accountant or were forwarded from the client.
15 8 Next, the issue is whether or not the person that receives the financial materials relies upon them in a transaction that the accountant intends the information to influence or one that is substantially similar to that transaction.' 59 Finally, a person would have to show their individual loss as a result of that reliance. 60 App. 1996 ) (holding that under Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 552, an accountant need not know exactly who is relying on his work product to be liable for negligent misrepresentation, only that the person be part of a class of people that the accountant is actually aware that will rely on his financial statements). misrepresentation cases in accounting cases to those involving the subprime market would seem especially appealing. Like accountants, the ratings companies would be liable for their financial analysis to those people that: (1) specifically request and pay for it; or (2) that they know will rely upon it by the person specifically requesting and paying for it or is within an limited group of persons whose reliance on their analysis is foreseeable. 6 2 The ratings companies prepare reports for a specific group of investors for a specific purpose.
6 3 Moreover, the number of participants in the credit rating agency markets is limited by federal legislation.' 64 Thus, the pool of individuals which investors can rely is limited, just as the market itself is limited.' 6 5 In this context, the rating companies should foresee that their ratings will be relied upon by the investors in this market and should they make negligent financial misrepresentations, liability must result. 66 Thus, under this model, investors in the subprime market could sue a rating company that negligently inflated their security ratings, if they can show reliance upon that information to their financial detriment.
The third basis for tort liability to the rating companies is the near privity rule, which is closely related to the concept of privity and, consequently, more narrow than the approach to negligent misrepresentation take by Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, or even the reasonable foreseeability rule. As alluded to earlier, many states require strict privity to impose liability on accountants for negligent misrepresentation.' 67 However, as circumstances have evolved, the strict privity rule has been eroded to a more fluid concept, which is able to reach injustices that the privity rule does not. For example, the New York Court of Appeals in a 1985 case, Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,' 68 applied near privity in the accounting context by clarifying its near privity rule with a three-prong test.1 69 Under the Credit Alliance test, a person seeking to impose liability on an auditor must show: (1) that the accountant knew his or her financial statements were going to be used for a specific purpose or for a set of limited, specific purposes; (2) that the accountant knew that certain parties would rely on his statements in furtherance of those purposes; and (3) that the accountant was familiar enough with the third party through his or her affirmative con- Applying this rule by analogy to investors hit in the credit meltdown, there would be little hope for an investor who lost money because of the misdeeds of the rating companies. First, the investor would have to show that the rating companies knew that their AAA ratings would be used for a specific purpose or set of specific purposes.
17 At first blush, that would seem fairly obvious as the RMBS market and the use of those ratings in that market is well-known and regulated.
1 72 Second, the investor would have to show that the rating companies knew that certain parties would rely upon the credit ratings for limited, specific purposes.
17 3 This too would seem fairly straightforward as the credit ratings are used for specific purposes in securitization and investment in securitization. The third test, however, would be fatal if not adapted to fit the RMBS market. 74 There, the investor would have to express through his or her conduct that the rating company knew the investor, such that it is clear that they were aware of his potential reliance on the credit ratings.
17 5 Although one could imagine situations where perhaps this would apply, in the usual case it would not. It would essentially require substantial evidence of conduct showing that there was a relationship between the investor/plaintiff and the rating company that was not quite enough to establish privity, but far too inflexible to rescue most investors from the sub prime mortgage meltdown. Thus, only by modifying this test to meet the realities of the market could this test be useful in providing potential liability to investors.
Finally there has been a recent movement among legal scholars to attempt to extend the doctrine of defective products liability to intangible consumer credit products. 7 6 These arguments are being developed to expand the defective products liability doctrine in order to protect consumers by holding the issuers of consumer credit products strictly liable for the harm their products cause where they currently escape lia-bility under simple negligence doctrine.' 7 7 If the courts accept these arguments and expand strict products liability standards to include RMBS ratings, investors will only need to prove that the ratings of the RMBS themselves are: (1) intangible products which should be analyzed similar to other tangible products, (2) defective at the time they were issued, (3) the investors were foreseeable third party users, and (4) harmed by the defective products. 7 8 First the investors will need to demonstrate that the ratings were in fact intangible products issued by the ratings companies. The ratings companies will likely attempt to use previously stated arguments that the ratings are not in fact products, but rather editorial reporting protected by the First Amendment or mere puffery not to be relied upon.' 7 9 As stated, the nature of the ratings of RMBS securities likely surpasses editorial journalism, and thus, under the analysis of In re Fitch, should not be afforded First Amendment Protection. 8 0 Additionally, considering the amount of information and analysis the ratings companies claim to use in determining the ratings, coupled with the amount of money the companies make generating the ratings, the claim that the ratings are mere puffery rather than actual products is untenable. In fact, in order to maintain the NRSRO rating with the government, the agencies are "required to produce credit ratings with integrity" or risk losing their valuable distinction as NRSROs. 8 ' The language of the NRSRO Guidelines indicates the ratings provided by the agencies are viewed by the government as quantifiable products of importance rather than mere puffery or editorial commentary. 8 ' Next, the investors, to obtain strict liability under the doctrine of manufacturer's defect, must show that the rating product was defective at the time it was issued. 8 3 To prove this, investors will initially direct the courts' attention to grossly understated ratings of default risk of RMBS. In response, ratings companies will argue that the real estate meltdown and its severity was an unforeseeable event. Thus, the ratings company will argue RMBS ratings products were not defective merely because they grossly underestimated default risk at the time they were issued, but rather, they were just another casualty of unforeseeable market events. However, investors could again point to warnings and market conditions that were essentially ignored by the ratings companies.' 8 4 Furthermore, a July 2008 SEC investigation found several issues of concern with the ratings companies' practices in issuing RMBS ratings.' 8 5 Investors could use the findings of the SEC investigation to demonstrate that the RMBS ratings were defectively issued for a variety of reasons. First, the SEC found that the agencies were severely understaffed in order to meet the volume of the ratings they issued at the peak of the market.' 86 As a result, the investors could argue risk analysis of the RMBS were incomplete or rushed, creating the defective rating products."S 7 Second the SEC identified concerns regarding the inherent conflict of interests between the ratings agencies and the clients from which they hoped to continue to generate business.' 88 The SEC in its report noted that such conflicts could impair the integrity of the ratings.
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Third, both Moody's and S&P acknowledged the existence of computer glitches that may have lead to inaccurately high ratings. 9 ' Finally, the SEC report referenced internal emails from employees of ratings agencies indicating a lack of good faith belief in the RMBS ratings.' 9 ' One particularly troubling e-mail expressed concerns that RMBS ratings models did not capture "half' of the risk of a particular transaction, but "it could be structured by cows and we would rate it.', 9 2 Another e-mail from a manager at a ratings agency referred to the RMBS market as a "monster" and said, "Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters." ' 19 3 Investors could proffer these SEC findings to show that the RMBS ratings were produced by the employees in a manner that made the RMBS ratings defective.
After demonstrating the RMBS ratings were defectively made, the investors must next show that they were foreseeable third party users harmed by the product. Again, the investors are ultimately the reason why issuers paid for the ratings agency to rate the RMBS securities. The investors used the ratings products in order to determine the price they were willing to buy or sell the security and underlying risk of the RMBS securities. 195 Also the ratings product helped guide the price investors would pay to buy or sell the securities.1 96 With the catastrophic failure of the ratings of RMBS, billions of dollars were lost by investors who relied on the ratings products. Considering the harm caused to both investors and the economy as a result of the defectively rated RMBS ratings, courts could reasonably determine the RMBS ratings were harmful defective products. Should the courts decide to extend the doctrine of manufacturing defect to RMBS ratings, ratings companies could be held strictly liable for their RMBS ratings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Financial institutions are not stagnant and injustice will occur if our legal system cannot adapt itself to meet the economic realities, such as those that led to the current real estate meltdown. This note examined the problem of the implosion of RMBS securities and the events leading up to it with an eye toward fashioning a speculative remedy to provide for justice. Unfortunately, our legal system currently does not have any law directly applicable to handle the situation and the state and Federal response to the crisis has provided mixed, albeit, limited success. By applying standards of contract theory such as promissory estoppel and tort theories of negligence and products liability to these security ratings companies, investors may be left with some recourse.
Extending liability to ratings companies is not, however, without unintended consequences. First, the ratings companies could not survive if they were held liable for all RMBS investor losses. The ratings com- panies play an essential role to the credit markets and their sudden collapse could disrupt the world economy. 1 97 This raises the issue of how far should the courts extend the liability to the ratings companies. Ideally the liability to ratings companies should not extend to the entire RMBS market. Doing so would essentially cause the ratings companies to be the unknowing guarantors to the RMBS market. This would go too far to prevent injustice. Also, even with some limits to the scope of liability to the ratings companies, the cost of corporate credit would become more expensive. The potential future liability would decrease the number of companies willing to issue ratings and act as a barrier to entry for smaller companies. Ratings companies that survive would likely increase the cost of their products to offset some of the liability risk and capitalize on the decreased competition. The increased costs of corporate credit as a result of the ratings companies' liability could adversely effect the economy.
Nonetheless, justice would not be served by allowing to the ratings companies to continue to avoid liability solely based on the potential unintended consequences. Ratings companies presented themselves as impartial third parties providing useful ratings products that reflect the default risk of the underlying investment. Over the past sixty years the ratings companies have in fact provided a valuable, and usually reliable, service to the credit markets. With the expansion into the market of subprime RMBS ratings, the ratings companies seemed to abandon their principles and controls upon which their reputation and credibility was established. As a result, investors who relied on the RMBS ratings suffered greater losses and the credit market as a whole was adversely effected. By maintaining liability for RMBS ratings, the ratings companies will perhaps be motivated to use more care in issuing their ratings in the future, an oft cited motivation for the imposition of tort liability. Furthermore, holding ratings companies accountable for improper credit ratings could restore investor confidence and help stimulate the weakened credit markets and the economy. Ideally expanding liability to ratings companies now will provide more stability to the credit markets and hopefully prevent unnecessary losses in the future. 197 . See discussion supra pp. 21-22; see also Kettering, supra note 104 at 1671-80.
